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ARGUELLO V. CONOCO, INC.,
330 F.3D 355 (5TH CIR. 2003)
FACTS
On March 5, 1995, Denise Arguello, her father Alberto Govea, and
other family members stopped at a Conoco store in Fort Worth, Texas, to
purchase gas.' Arguello's husband filled up the car with gas and Arguello
and Govea went inside the store to pay for the gas and to pick up some beer
and other items.2 Cindy Smith, one of the two clerks on duty, waited on
them at the cash register.3 Arguello and Govea, who are Hispanic, testified
that Smith treated them less favorably than she had treated the previous
white customers.4 When Arguello gave Smith her credit card to complete the
purchase, Smith asked for identification, claiming that she needed to see
identification because Arguello was purchasing beer.5 Asserting that she
could not accept an out of state license, Smith initially refused to accept
Arguello's Oklahoma license.6 During the encounter between Smith and
Arguello, Govea, angered by the way Smith was treating his daughter,
walked out of the store and left the beer he intended to purchase on the
counter.7 Finally, Smith agreed to accept Arguello's license and credit card.8
Smith, however, did not ring up the beer that Govea left on the counter.9
After Arguello completed her purchase, the interaction between Smith and
Arguello escalated and Smith began shouting racially discriminatory remarks
toward Arguello.10 Arguello started to leave the store, but discovered that
she had the wrong credit card slip and returned to the counter to exchange
the credit card slips." Smith shouted a few more racially charged remarks at
Arguello and hastily exchanged slips with her. As Arguello walked away
from the counter, Smith pushed the six-pack of beer off the counter and onto
the floor.' 2 When Arguello walked outside to her car, Smith made rude
gestures, laughed, and heckled Arguello and her family. 3
Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003).
2 Id. at 356.
3 Id. at 357.
I d.
I ld. The facts did not indicate if Smith ever asked Govea for identification, even though he was
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Govea called a Conoco representative from a pay phone outside the
store to lodge a complaint against Smith.14  The Conoco representative
directed Govea to find out the name of the clerk.' 5 Not knowing Smith's
name at that point, Govea attempted to re-enter the store.' 6 However, Smith
locked the door and continued to make fun of Arguello and her family
through the store windows. 7
Arguello and Govea sued the owner of Conoco alleging race
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.18 At trial, the jury found for
Arguello and Govea and awarded them compensatory and punitive
damages.' 9 However, the United States District Court Judge for the Northern
District of Texas, Judge Barefoot Sanders, granted a post verdict judgment as
a matter of law (j.m.l.) in favor of the defendant owner, finding that the
record provided no reasonable basis upon which a reasonable jury could have
found for the plaintiffs.20 Arguello and Govea appealed.2
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's ruling holding that: (1) the plaintiffs' claims did not amount
to a violation of § 1981; and (2) the plaintiffs lacked the standing required to
assert a Title VII claim.
22
ANALYSIS
Noting that this case involved the de novo review of the j.m.1
overturning the jury's finding for the plaintiffs at trial, the appellate court
began its analysis by pointing out that a j.m.1 is only proper where there is no
legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to have found for a party.23 The
review of a motion for j.m.l. requires that the reviewing court "consider the
entire trial record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, drawing















The court then addressed the merits of the lower court's finding. In
order to state a claim in the making and enforcing of contracts under § 1981,
plaintiffs must establish that: (1) they are members of a racial minority; (2)
the defendant intentionally discriminated against them; and (3) the
discrimination was directed towards one of more of the activities enumerated
under § 1981 .25 The court found that Arguello and Govea, as Hispanics,
26thseclearly satisfied the first element. As to the second element, courts
generally find that plaintiffs can establish evidence of race discrimination
where there is a basis for comparison between the defendant's treatment of a
white person and their treatment of a minority and there is no obvious reason
for the difference in treatment. 7 The court found that there was sufficient
evidence to show that the Smith's treatment of Arguello and Govea was less
favorable than her treatment of white customers.28 Furthermore, the court
found that Smith failed to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for her
treatment of Arguello and Govea. 29 Accordingly, the court found that a jury
could reasonably conclude that Smith intentionally discriminated against
Arguello and Govea.30
However, the court noted that § 1981 does not provide a general
cause of action for race discrimination claims.' In order to establish a claim
under § 1981, plaintiffs must also meet the third element, requiring that the
discrimination involve one of the enumerated activities of § 1981 .32 Among
other things, § 1981 prohibits discrimination in the making and enforcing of
contracts.33 However, in line with the treatment of other courts addressing
this issue, this court held that in order for Arguello and Govea to recover
they must show the "loss of an actual, not speculative, or prospective
contract interest. 3 4 The court explained that under § 1981 it is not enough
for a defendant to have deterred the plaintiff from contracting or have treated
the plaintiff less favorably than others during the making of the contract.35
Under § 1981, plaintiffs can recover only if "they were actually prevented,
and not merely deterred, from making a contract or purchasing a service. 36
Under this narrow construction of § 1981, the court held that neither
Govea nor Arguello could establish that Smith's behavior thwarted their
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1998).
28 Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2003).
29 Id.
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attempts to contract." With respect to Govea, the court found that his
decision not to purchase his beer because of Smith's treatment of his
daughter was a voluntary choice not to contract.3 8 Therefore, § 1981 did not
proscribe Smith's conduct, even though it was discriminatory. Furthermore,
the court found that Smith's actions of locking the door and preventing
Govea from re-entering did not violate § 1981 because Govea was not
attempting to enter the store to purchase a product, but to ascertain Smith's
name for the Conoco representative.39
Similarly, the court found that Smith's treatment of Arguello was not
actionable under § 1981 .40 Arguello was able to complete her purchase, at
the regular price, using her preferred method of payment.41 The court,
however, noted that Arguello was not able to purchase the beer.42 Arguello
contended that she expected Smith to ring up the beer with the rest of the
purchases and that she would have purchased the beer in a second transaction
it if were not for Smith's behavior. The court, however, found that
regardless of Arguello's intentions, the only action she took to indicate her
desire to buy the beer was to slide the beer across the counter closer to her
purchases after her father left the store.43 Noting that after Arguello realized
that she had not purchased the beer she did not take any further steps to show
her intent to her purchase the beer in a second transaction, the court found
that Smith's failure to sell her the beer did not constitute conduct that
thwarted Arguello's attempt to contract.44
Asserting that the court should have adopted a broader interpretation
of § 1981, Arguello and Govea argued that § 1981 should cover conduct
occurring after the completed purchase.4' They point out that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, enacted as a direct response to Patterson v. McLean,46
expressly provides for a broad interpretation of § 1981.47 In Patterson, the
petitioner, a black woman, sued her employer alleging a violation of § 1981
when he engaged in a pattern of racially discriminatory acts towards her after







43 Id. The court, however, did not address the fact that Smith claimed that she asked Arguello for
identification for the beer but then failed to ring up the beer along with the other purchases.
" Id.
45 Id. at 360.
" Patterson v. McLean, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).




taking place after the formation of the employment contract.49 The Supreme
Court, however, held that § 1981 did not apply to problems arising after the
creation of the contract.50 The effect of Patterson had an unreasonably
limiting effect on race discrimination claims.51  In response, Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,2 explicitly rejecting Patterson's
narrow interpretation of § 1981 and reaffirming that the provision
proscribing conduct that interfered with the right to "make and enforce
contracts" included "all phases and incidents of the contractual
relationship."53
Arguello and Govea argued that this new language indicated
Congress's intent to proscribe discriminatory conduct that occurred after the
formation of the contract.5 4 The court, however, rejected this argument
distinguishing between an employment contract and a retail contract.55 The
court reasoned that the terms and conditions of an employment contract
extend from contract formation until termination. 6 A retail contract, the
court explained, does not involve a continuing relationship. 7 It is a single
transaction where the parties transfer property from one another in exchange
for some type of consideration, usually monetary.58 Therefore, the contract
ends upon the exchange of goods.5 9 The court found that § 1981 is
applicable only so long as the contractual relationship continues.60
The court, however, noted that there are two situations in which §
1981 is applicable even after the completion of a purchase: (1) situations
involving discrimination in clubs and restaurants; and (2) discrimination in
pre-payment or check writing policies.6' In the club or restaurant context,
the court explained, the contractual relationship entails more than just
exchange of food for money.62 The payment includes the customer's right to
service and the contract continues throughout the course of the meal.63
49 Id, at 170.
50 Id.
51 Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil Rights
Protection, 66 MO. L. REV. 275, 299 (2001).
52 Id.
53 Id.




58 Id. at 360; see also Grinnell Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 932, 947-48 (Fed. CI. 1968).
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Therefore, § 1981 proscribes discriminatory conduct of servers during the
meal.64
Additionally, the court noted that § 1981 covers discrimination in
check writing or prepayment policies.65 In this situation, the court explained
that if the terms of the contract are discriminatory, it is not necessary for a
plaintiff to prove the inference with the ability to contract. The language of §
1981 specifically gives minorities the right to enjoy the same "benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship" as whites.66
Therefore, to establish a violation of § 1981, a plaintiff alleging
discrimination in payment policies need only show that the conditions of
67payment were discriminatory.
The court, however, found that in the instant case neither of the
situations in which § 1981 is applicable after the completion of a purchase-
discriminatory terms and conditions in payment, or an ongoing contractual
relationship associated with clubs and restaurants-was present.68 Therefore,
the court concluded, no violation of § 1981 had occurred.
Finally, the court noted that Govea and Arguello were not able to
state a valid claim for injunctive relief because they lacked standing. 69 For a
plaintiff to obtain injunctive relief, he must demonstrate "that he is likely to
suffer future injury by the defendant and that the sought-after relief will
prevent that future injury. 70  Finding that evidence of Conoco's
discriminatory treatment of Govea and Arguello in the past does not
necessarily mean that they will encounter similar treatment in the future, the
court held that they were not eligible for injunctive relief.7'
CONCLUSION
Consumer discrimination is anathema to a fair and just society.
However, despite Congressional action explicitly delegating broad authority
to courts, pursuant to § 1981, to guarantee racial minorities the same right as
whites to the "benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship," most courts continue to unreasonably limit the claims of
6 See Charity v. Denny's, Inc., No. CIV.A.98-0554-C, 1999 WL 544687, at *3 (E.D. La. 1999)
(finding that a customer dining in a restaurant is contracting for more than just food); McCaleb v. Pizza
Hut of Am., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (finding that customers have a right to the full
benefit of a restaurant contract that includes, among others things, a pleasant atmosphere to dine in and
proper utensils).
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minority claimants. The reluctance of courts to adopt the permissible broad
application of § 1981 perpetuates an acceptance of discriminatory treatment
in society and sends a message to minorities that they are not worthy of the
same treatment as whites. Courts must give effect to the Civil Rights Act of
1991 and use their authority pursuant to § 1981 to give redress to victims of
discrimination, sending the message to society that discrimination is wrong
and will not be tolerated.
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